GENERAL  TAYLOR'S  LETTERS. 


LETTER  OF  GEN.  TAYLOR  TO  GEN.  GAINES—  SECRETARY  MAR- 
CY'S  REPRIMAND  OF  GEN.  TAYLOR—  AND  GEN.  TAYLOR'S 
REPLY  ;  WITH  THE  FABLE  ALLUDED  TO  ANNEXED. 

LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  TAYLOR  TO  GENERAL  GAItfES. 

B'^J)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION  OR  INVASION, 

I  8*     '*•"  Monterey,  Mexico,  November  9,  1846. 


MY  DEAR  *******:  Your  very  kind  and  acceptable  letter  of  the  31st  August, 
********  reached  m6  only  a  short  time  since,  for  which  I  beg  leave  to  tender  you 
my  sincere  thanks.  [A  few  confidential  remarks  on  certain  public  transactions  are 
here  omitted.] 

After  considerable  apparent  delay  on  the  part  of  the  Quartermasters  Department,  in 

getting  steamboats  into  the  Rio  Grande  adapted  to  its  navigation,  I  succeeded,  towards 

the  latter  part  of  August,  in  throwing  forward  to  Camargo  (a  town  situated  on  the  San 

Juan  river,  three  miles  from  its  junction  with  the  Rio  Grande,  on  the  west  side,  nearly 

500  miles  from  Brasos  Island  by  water,  and  200  by  land,  and  140  from  this  place)  a  con 

siderable  depot  of  provisions,  ordnance,  ammunition,  and  forage,  and  then,  having  brought 

!o  together  an  important  portion  of  my  command,   I  determined  on  moving  on   this  place. 

Accordingly,  after  collecting  1,700  pack  mules,  with  their  attendants  and  conductors,  in. 

the  enemy's  country,  (the  principal  means  of  transportation  for  our  provisions,  baggage, 

&c.,)  I  left,  on  the  5th  of  September,  to  join  my  advnnce,  which  had  preceded  me  a  few 

'     days  to  Seralvo,  a  small  village  75  miles  on  the  route,  which  I  did  on  the  9th,  and,  after 

waiting  there  a  few  days  for  some  of  the  corps  to  get  up,  moved  on  and  reached  here  on 

the  19th,  wiih  6,250  men  —  2,700  regulars,  the  balance  volunteers.     For  what  took  place 

afterwards,  1  must  refer  you  to  my  several  reports—  particularly  to  my  detailed  one  of  the 

•    9th  ultimo. 

^  I  do  not  believe  the  authorities  at  Washington  are  at  all  satisfied  with  my  conduct  in 
regard  to  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  entered  into  with  the  Mexican  commander,  which 
you  no  doubt  have  seen,  as  they  have  been  made  public  through  the  official  organ,  and 
copied  into  various  other  newspapers.  I  have  this  moment  recieved  an  answer  (to  my  despatch  an 
nouncing  the  surrender  of  Monterey,  and  the  circumstances  attending  the  same)  from  the  Secretary 
of  War,  stating  that  "  it  was  regretted  by  the  President  that  it  was  not  deemed  advisable  to  insist 
on  the  terms  I  had  proposed  in  my  first  communication  to  the  Mexican  commander  in  regard  to  giving 
up  the  city,"  adding  that  "  the  circumstances  which  dictated,  no  doubt  justified  the  change."  AL- 
".  though  the  terms  of  capitulation  may  be  considered  too  liberal  on  our  part  by  the  President  and  his 
v  advisers,  as  well  as  by  many  others  at  a  distance,  particularly  by  those  who  do  not  understand  the 
""^...position  which  we  occupied,  (otherwise  they  might  come  to  a  different  conclusion  in  regard  to  the 
matter,)  yet,  on  due  reflection,  I  see  nothing  to  induce  me  to  regret  the  course  I  pursued.  The  pro 
position  on  the  part  of  General  Ampudia,  which  had  much  to  do  in  determining  my  course  in  the 
matter,  was  based  on  the  ground  that  our  Government  had  proposed  to  his  to  settle  the  existing  dif 
ficulties  by  negotiation,  (which  I  knew  was  the  case  without  knowing  the  result,)  which  was  then 
under  consideration  by  the  proper  authorities,  and  which  he  (General  Ampudia)  had  no  doubt  would 
result  favorably,  as  the  whole  of  his  people  were  in  favor  of  peace.  If  so,  I  considered  the  further 
effusion  of  blood  not  only  unnecessary  but  improper.  Their  force  was  also  considerably  larger  than, 
ours,  and,  from  the  size  and  position  of  the  place,  we  could  not  completely  invest  it  ;  so  that  the 
greater  portion  of  their  troops,  if  not  the  whole,  had  they  been  disposed  to  do  so,  could  any  night  have 
abandoned  the  city,  at  once  entered  the  mountain  passes,  and  effected  their  retreat,  do  what  we 
~could.  Had  we  been  put  to  the  alternative  of  taking  the  place  by  storm,  (which  there  is  no  doubt  we 
should  have  succeeded  in  doing,)  we  should  in  all  probability  have  lost  fifty  or  a  hundred  men  in  killed, 
besides  the  wounded,  which  I  wished  to  avoid,  as  there  appeared  to  be  a  prospect  of  peace,  even  if  a 
distant  one.  I  also  wished  to  avoid  the  destruction  of  women  and  children,  which  must  have  been 
very  great  had  the  storming  process  been  resorted  to.  Besides,  they  had  a  very  large  and  strong  for 
tification  a  short  distance  from  the  city,  which,  if  carried  with  the  bayonet,  must  have  been  taken  at 
great  sacrifice  of  life,  and,  with  our  limited  train  of  heavy  or  battering  artillery,  it  would  have  re 
quired  twenty  or  twenty-five  days  to  take  it  by  regular  approaches. 

That  they  should  have  surrendered  a  place  nearly  as  strong  as  Quebec,  well  fortified  under  the  di 
rection  of  skilful  engineers  —  their  works  garnished  with  forty-two  pieces  of  artillery,  abundantly 
supplied  with  ammunition,  garrisoned  with  7,000  regular  and  2,000  irregular  troops,  in  addition  to 
some  thousand  citizens  capable  of  (and  no  doubt  actually)  bearing  arms,  and  aiding  in  its  defence  — 
to  an  opposing  force  of  half  their  number,  scantily  supplied  with  provisions,  and  with  a  light  train  of 
artillery,  is  among  the  unaccountable  occurrences  of  the  times. 

I  am  decidedly  opposed  to  carrying  the  war  beyond  Saltillo  in  this  direction,  which  place  has  been 
entirely  abandoned  by  the  Mexican  forces,  all  of  whom  have  been  concentrated  at  San  Luis  Potogi  j 

F^Oi" 

1  1 


and  I  shall  lose  no  time  in  taking  possession  of  the  former  as  soon  as  the  cessation  of  hostilities  re 
ferred  to  expires — which  I  have  notified  the  Mexican  authorities  will  be  the  case  on  the  13th  instant, 
by  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

fc  If  we  are  (in  the  language  of  Mr.  Polk  and  General  Scott)  under  the  necessity  of  "  conquering 
a  peace,"  and  that  by  taking  the  capital  of  the  country,  we  must  go  to  Vera  Cruz,  take  that  place, 
and  then  march  on  to  the  city  of  Mexico.  To  do  so  in  any  other  direction  I  consider  out  of  the 
question.  But,  admitting  that  we  conquer  a  peace  by  doing  so — say  at  the  end  of  the  next  twelve 
months — will  the  amount  of  blood  and  treasure  that  must  be  expended  in  doing  so  be  compensated 
by  the  same  ?  I  think  not — especially  if  the  country  we  subdue  is  to  be  given  up  ;  and  I  ima 
gine  there  are  but  few  individuals  in  our  country  who  think  of  annexing  Mexico  to  the  United  States. 

I  do  not  intend  to  carry  on  my  operations  (as  previously  stated)  beyond  Saltillo,  deeming  it  next 
to  impracticable  to  do  so.  It  then  becomes  a  question  as  to  what  is  best  to  be  done.  It  seems  to 
me  that  the' most  judicious  course  to  be  pursued  on  our  part  would  be  to  take  possession  at  once  of 
the  line  we  would  accept  by  negotiation,  extending  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  the  Pacific,  and  oc 
cupy  the  same,  or  keep  what  we  already  have  possession  of;  and  that,  with  Tampeco,  (which  I  hope 
to  take  in  the  course  of  the  next  month,  or  as  soon  as  I  can  get  the  means  of  transportotion,)  will 
give  us  all  on  this  side  of  the  Sierra  Madre,  and,  as  soon  as  I  occupy  Saltillo,  will  include  six  or 
seven  States  as  Provinces,  thus  holding  Tampico,  Victoria,  Monterey,  Saltillo,  Monclova,  Chihuahua, 
(•frhich  I  presume  General  Wool  has  possession  of  by  this  time,)  Santa  Fe,  and  the  Californias,  and 
say  to  Mexico,"  Drive  us  from  the  country" — throwing  on  her  the  responsibility  and  expense  of 
carrying  on  offensive  war ;  at  the  same  time  closely  blockading  all  her  ports  on  the  Pacific  and  the 
Gulf.  A  course  of  this  kind,  if  persevered  in  for  a  short  time,  would  soon  bring  her  to  her  proper 
senses,  and  compel  her  to  sue  for  peace,  provided  there  is  a  Government  in  the  country  sufficiently 
stable  for  us  to  treat  with,  which  I  fear  will  hardly  be  the  case  for  many  years  to  come.  Without 
large  reinforcements  cf  volunteers  from  the  United  States — say  ten  or  fifteen  thousand,  (those  previ 
ously  sent  out  having  already  been  greatly  reduced  by  sickness  and  other  casualties,)  I  do  not  believe  it 
would  be  advisable  to  march  beyond  Saltillo,  which  is  more  than  two  hundred  miles  beyond  our  de 
pots  on  the  Rio  Grande — a  very  long  line  on  which  to  keep  up  supplies,  (over  a  land  route  in  a  coun 
try  like  this,)  for  a  large  force,  and  certain  to  be  attended  with  an  expense  which  will  be  frightful  to 
Contemplate  when  closely  looked  into. 

From  Saltillo  to  San  Louis  Potosi,  the  next  place  of  importance  on  the  road  to  the  city  of  Mexico, 
is  three  hundred  miles  ;  one  hundred  and  forty  badly  watered,  where  no  supplies  of  any  kind  could 
be  procured  for  men  or  horses.  I  hare  informed  the  War  Department  that  20,000  efficient  men 
would  be  neeessary  to  ensure  success  if  we  move  on  that  place,  (a  city  containing  a  population  of 
60,000.  where  the  enemy  could  bring  together  and  sustain,  besides  the  citizens,  an  army  of  50,000,) 
a  force  which.  I  apprehend,  will  hardly  be  collected  by  us,  with  the  train  necessary  to  feed  it,  as  well 
as  to  transport  various  other  supplies,  particularly  ordnance  and  munitions  of  war. 

In  regard  to  th?  armistice,  which  would  have  expired  by  limitation  in  a  few  days,  we  lost  nothing 
by  it,  as  we  could  not  move  even  now,  had  the  enemy  continued  to  occupy  Saltillo  ;  for,  strange  to 
say,  the  first  wagon  which  has  reached  me  since  the  declaration  of  war  was  on  the  2d  instant,  the 
same  day  on  which  I  received  from  Washington  an  ackdowledgment  of  my  despatch  announcing 
the  taking  of  Monterey  ;  and  then  I  received  only  one  hundred  and  thirty-five;  so  that  I  have  been, 
since  May  last,  completely  crippled,  and  am  still  so,  for  want  of  transportation.  After  raking  and 
scraping  the  country  for  miles  around  Camargo,  collecting  every  pack-mule  and  other  means  of 
transportation,  I  could  bring  here  only  80,000  rations,  (fifteen  day's  supply,)  with  a  moderate  supply 
of  ordnance,  ammunition,  &.C.,  to  do  which  all  the  corps  had  to  leave  behind  a  portion  of  their  camp 
equipage  necessary  for  their  comfort;  and,  in  some  instances  among  the  volunteers,  their  personal 
baggage.  I  moved  in  such  a  way,  and  with  such  limited  means  that,  had  I  not  succeeded,  I 
should  no  doubt  have  been  severely  reprimanded,  if  nothing  worse.  I  did  so  to  sustain  the  Admin 
istration.  *  *  *  * 

Of  the  two  regiments  of  mounted  men  from  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  who  left  their  respective 
States  to  join  me  in  June,  the  latter  has  just  reached  Camargo  ;  the  former  had  not  got  to  Matamo- 
raa  at  the  latest  dates  from  there.  Admitting  that  they  will  be  as  long  in  returning  as  in  getting 
ijjere,  (to  say  nothing  of  the  time  necessary  to  recruit  their  horses,)  and  were  to  be  discharged  in 
time  to  reach  their  homes,  they  could  serve  in  Mexico  but  a  very  short  time. 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  not  made  with  the  view  of  finding  fault  with  any  one,  but  to  point  out 
the  difficulties  with  which  I  have  had  to  contend. 

Monterey,  the  capital  of  New  Leon,  is  situated  on  the  San  Juan  river,  where  it  comes  out  of  the 
mountains — the  city  (which  contains  a  population  of  about  twelve  thousand)  being  in  part  surround 
ed  by  them — at  the  head  of  a  large  and  beautiful  valley.  The  houses  are  of  stone,  in  the  Moorish 
style,  with  flat  roofs,  which,  with  their  strongly  enclosed  yards  and  gardens  in  high  stone  walls,  all 
looped  for  musketry,  make  them  each  a  fortress  within  itself.  It  is  the  most  important  place  in 
Northern  Mexico,  (or  on  the  east  side  of  Sierra  Madre,)  csmmanding  the  only  pass  or  road  for  car 
riages  from  this  side,  between  it  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  to  the  table-lands  of  the  Sierra,  by  or 
through  which  the  city  of  Mexico  can  be  reached. 

I  much  fear  I  shall  have  exhausted  your  patience  before  you  get  half  through  this  longand  unin 
teresting  letter.  If  so,  you  can  only  commit  it  to  the  flames,  and  think  no  more  about  it,  as  I  write 
in  great  haste,  besides  being  interrupted  every  five  minutes ;  so  that  you  must  make  great  allow- 


ances  for  blots,  interliniations,  and  blunders,  as  well  as  want  of  connexion  in  many  parts  of  the  same. 
Be  so  good  as  to  present  me  most  kindly  to  your  excellent  lady,  and  accept  my  sincere  wishes  for 
•your  good  health,  prosperity,  and  fame. 

I  remain,  truly  and  sincerely,  your  friend,  Z.  TAYLOR. 


MR.  MARCY'S  REPRIMAND. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,   WASHINGTON,  January  27,  1847. 

SIR:  I  deem  it  proper  to  send  to  you  a  letter  (taken  from  a  newspaper)  which  first 
appeared  in  the  "New  York  Morning  Express,"  and  has  since,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
been  transferred  to  many  other  journals.  I  learn  from  General  Gaines  that  the  letter  is 
genuine.  This  information,  I  am  assured,  he  had  previously  given  to  others.  As  the 
letter  was  not  marked  "  confidential,"  he  adjudged  that  circumstances  existed  which 
justified  the  publication  of  some  part  of  it,  though  he  expresses  an  opinion  that  it  was 
not  written  with  such  a  view. 

It  will,  in  a  short  time,  be  in  possession  of  our  enemy  ;  and  coming,  as  it  does,  from 
the  General  to  whom  the  conduct  of  the  war,  on  our  part,  was  confided,  it  will  convey 
most  valuable  information  to  the  Mexican  Commander,  not  only  in  relation  to  our  present 
line  of  operations,  but  as  to  the  new  one,  which  alone,  in  your  opinion,  can  be  taken  with 
a  prospect  of  success,  if  an  attempt  is  to  be  made  on  the  city  of  Mexico. 

The  disclosure  of  your  views,  as  to  the  future  operations  of  our  forces,  accompanied, 
as  it  is,  with  your  opinion,  that  the  fruits  of  the  war,  if  completely  successful,  will  be 
of  little  worth  to  u*,  will,  it  is  greatly  to  be  feared,  not  only  embarrass  our  subsequent 
movements,  but  disincline  the  enemy  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace.  With  particu 
lar  reference  to  these  effects,  the  publication  is  most  deeply  to  be  regretted. 

The  650th  paragraph  of  the  General  Regulations  of  the  Army,  published  March  1, 
1825,  declares  that  "  Private  letters  or  reports,  relative  to  military  marches  and  opera 
tions  are  frequently  mischievous  in  design,  and  always  disgraceful  to  the  army.  They 
are  therefore  strictly  forbidden,  and  any  officer  found  guilty  of  making  such  report  for  publi 
cation,  without  special  permission,  or  of  placing  the  writing  beyond  his  control,  so  that  it 
finds  its  way  to  the  press,  within  one  month  after  the  termination  of  the  campaign  to 
which  it  relates,  shall  be  dismissed  from  the  service." 

This  paragraph  was  not  included  in  the  compilation  of  the  General  Regulations,  pub 
lished  in  1841,  but  is  deemed  peculiarly  applicable  to  a  state  of  war,  and  the  President  has 
directed  it  to  be  republished,  and  the  observance  of  it  strictly  enjoined  upon  all  fficers. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedieutservant,     W.  L.  MARCY, 

Major  General  Z.  TAYLOR,    U.   S.  Army,  in  Mexico.  Secretary  of  War. 

LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  TAYLOR  TO  MR.  MARCY. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,  Agua  Nueia,  March  3,  1847. 

SIR  :  I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  communication  of  January  27th,  enclosing 
a  newspaper  slip,  and  expressing  the  regret  of  the  Department  that  the  letter  copied  in, 
that  slip,  and  which  was  addressed  by  myself  to  Major  General  Gaines,  should  have 
been  published. 

Although  your  letter  does  not  convey  the  direct  censure  of  the  Department  or  of  the 
President,  yet,  when  it  is  taken  in  connexion  wiih  the  revival  of  a  paragraph  in  the  re 
gulations  of  1825,  touching  the  publication  of  private  letters  concerning  operations  in  the 
field,  I  am  not  permitted  to  doubt  that  I  have  become  the  subject  of  Executive  disap 
probation.  To  any  expression  of  it,  coming  with  the  authority  of  the  President,  I  am 
•bound  by  my  duty,  and  by  my  respect  for  his  high  office,  patiently  to  submit;  but,  lest 
my  silence  should  be  construed  into  a  tacit  admission  of  the  grounds  and  conclusions  set 
forth  in  your  communication,  I  deem  it  a  duty  which  I  owe  to  myself  to  submit  a  few 
remarks  in  reply.  I  shall  be  pardoned  for  speaking  plainly. 

In  the  first  place,  the  published  letter  bears  upon  its  face  the  most  conclusive  evidence 
that  it  was  intended  only  for  private  perusal,  and  not  at  all  for  publication.  It  was  pub 
lished  without  my  knowledge,  and  contrary  to  my  wishes.  Surely,  1  need  not  say  that 
I  am  not  in  the  habit  of  writing  for  the  newspapers.  The  letter  was  a  familiar  one, 
written  to  an  old  military  friend,  with  whom  I  have  for  many  years  interchanged  opin 
ions  on  professional  subjects.  That  he  should  think  proper,  under  any  circumstances,  to 
publish  it  could  not  have  been  foreseen  by  me. 

In  the  absence  of  proof  that  the  publication  was  made  with  my  authority  or  knowl 
edge,  I  may  be  permitted  to  say  that  the  quotation  in  your  letter  of  the  six  hundred  and 
fiftieth  paragraph  of  the  superseded  regulations  of  1825,  in  which  the  terms  "  mischiev- 
ous"  and  "  disgraceful"  are  employed  to  characterize  certain  letters  or  reports,  conveys, 


though  not  openly,  a  measure  of  rebuke  which,  to  say  the  least,  is  rather  harsh,  and 
which  many  may  think  not  warranted  by  the  premises.  Again:  I  have  carefully  ex 
amined  the  letter  in  question,  and  I  do  not  admit  that  it  is.  obnoxious  to  ihe  objections 
urged  in  your  communication.  I  see  nothing  in  it  which,  under  the  same  circumstances, 
I  would  not  write  again.  To  suppose  that  it  will  give  the  enemy  valuable  information, 
touching  our  past  or  prospective  line  of  operations,  is  lo  know  very  little  of  the  Mexican 
sources  of  information,  or  of  their  extraordinary  sagacity  and  facilities  in  keeping  con 
stantly  apprized  of  our  movements. 

As  to  my  particular  views  in  regard  to  the  general  policy  to  be  pursued  towards  Mexico, 
I  perceive  by  the  public  journals  that  they  are  shared  by  many  distinguished  statemen, 
and  also  in  part  by  a  conspicuous  officer  of  the  navy,  the  publication  of  whose  opinions 
is  not  perhaps  obstructed  by  any  regulations  of  his  Department.  It  is  difficult,  then,  to 
imagine  that  the  diffusion  of  mine  can  render  any  peculiar  aid  to  the  enemy,  or  specially 
disincline  him  "  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace." 

In  conclusion,  I  would  say  that  it  has  given  me  great  pain  to  be  brought  into  the  posi 
tion  in  which  I  now  find  myself  with  regard  to  the  Department  of  War  and  the  Govern 
ment.  It  has  not  been  of  my  own  seeking.  To  the  extent  of  my  ability,  and  the  means 
placed  at  my  disposal,  I  have  sought  faithfully  to  serve  the  country  by  carrying  out  the 
wishes  and  instructions  of  the  Executive.  But  it  cannot  be  concealed  that  since  the  capitu 
lation  of  Monterey  the  confidence  of  the  Department,  and  I  too  much  fear  of  the  Presi 
dent,  has  been  gradually  withdrawn,  and  my  consideration  and  usefulness  correspond 
ingly  diminished.  The  apparent  determination  of  the  Department  to  place  rne  in  an 
attitude  antagonistical  to  the  Government  has  an  apt  illustration  in  the  well-known  fable 
of  Esop.*  But  I  ask  no  favor,  and  I  shrink  from  no  responsibility.  While  entrusted 
with  the  command  in  this  quarter  I  shall  continue  to  devote  all  my  energies  to  the  public 
good,  looking  for  my  reward  to  the  consciousness  of  pure  motives  and  the  final  verdict  of 
impartial  history. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,  Z.  TAYLOR, 

Maj.  Gen.  U.  S.  A.,  commanding. 

Hon.  W.  L.  MAKCY,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington. 

*  THE  WOLF  AND  THE  LAMB. 

One  hot,  sultry  day,  a  Wolf  and  a  Lamb  happened  to  come,  just  at  the  same  time, 
to  quench  their  thirst  in  the  stream  of  a  clear,  silver  brook  that  ran  tumbling  down  the 
side  of  a  rocky  mountain.  The  Wolf  stood  upon  the  higher  ground,  and  the  Lamb  at 
some  distane  from  him  down  the  current.  However,  the  Wolf,  having  a  mind  to  pick 
a  quarrel  with  him,  asked  him,  what  he  meant  by  disturbing  the  water,  and  making  it 
so  muddy  that  he  could  not  drink  ?  and,  at  the  same  time,  demanded  satisfaction.  The 
Lamb,  frightened  at  this  threatening  charge,  told  him,  in  a  tone  as  mild  as  possible,  that, 
with  humble  submission,  he  could  not  conceive  how  that  could  be;  since  the  water 
which  he  drank,  ran  down  from  the  Wolf  to  him,  and  therefore  it  could  not  be  disturbed 
so  far  up  the  stream.  "Be  that  as  it  will,"  replies  the  Wolf,  "you  are  a  rascal,  and  I 
have  been  told  that  you  treated  me  with  ill  language,  behind  my  back,  about  half  a  year 
ago," — "Upon  my  word,"  says  the  Lamb,  "the  time  you  :^L;ition  was  before  I  was 
born."  The  Wolf,  finding  it  to  no  purpose  to  argue  any  longer  against  truth,  fell  into  a 
great  passion,  snarling  and  foaming  at  the  mouth,  as  it  he  had  been  mad ;  and  drawing 
nearer  to  the  Lamb,  "Sirrah,"  says  he,  "if  it  was  not  you,  it  was  your  father,  and  that 
is  all  one."  So  he  seized  the  poor  innocent  helpless  thing,  tore  it  to  pieces,  and  made  a 
meal  of  it. 

APPLICATION. 

The  thing  which  is  pointed  at  in  this  fable  is  so  obvious,  that  it  will  be  impertinent 
to  multiply  words  about  it.  When  a  cruel  ill-natured  man  has  a  mind  to  abuse  one  in 
ferior  to  himself,  either  in  power  or  courage,  though  he  has  not  given  the  least  occasion; 
for  it,  how  does  he  resemble  the  Wolf!  whose  envious,  rapacious  temper  could  not  bear 
to  see  innocence  live  quietly  in  its  neighborhood.  In  short,  wherever  ill  people  are  in 
power,  innocence  and  integrity  are  sure  to  be  persecuted  ;  the  more  vicious  the  commu 
nity  is,  the  belter  countenance  they  have  for  their  own  villanous  measures.  To  practice 
Lonesty  in  bad  times,  is  being  liable  to  suspicion  enough  ;  but  if  any  one  should  dare  to 
prescribe  it,  it  is  ten  to  one  but  he  would  be  impeached  of  high  crimes  and  misdemean 
ors ;  for  to  stand  up  for  justice  in  a  degenerate  and  corrupt  State,  is  tacitly  to  upbraid  the 
Government,  and  seldom  fails  of  pulling  down  vengeance  upon  the  head  of  him  that 
offers  to  stir  in  its  defence.  Where  cruelty  and  malice  are  in  combination  with  power, 
nothing  is  so  easy  as  for  them  to  find  a  p^tence  to  tyrannize  over  innocence,  and  exer 
cise  alf  manper  of  injustice. 


